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On the question of whether prices are higher in poor, urban neighborhoods, the prior research is
decidedly mixed.  This paper revisits the question by analyzing unpublished price-level data
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for construction of the Consumer Price Index.  Using
this large, statistically representative sample of stores in poor and affluent neighborhoods, I first
estimate if a price difference exists.  I then empirically test the major arguments in support of
disparate prices such as differences in quality, operating and consumer search costs.  I also explore
the relationship between pricing strategies and the racial and ethnic composition of poor
neighborhoods.  I find that market prices are up to 6 percent less in poor neighborhoods after
controlling for a variety of covariates.  In addition, I find that poor, predominantly white and
Hispanic neighborhoods experience significant discounts, while market prices in poor,
predominantly black neighborhoods are comparable to those in affluent white areas.
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I. Introduction
Whether the poor pay more for basic food items has been a source of bitter empirical
controversy for several decades.  This paper contains the results of the first comprehensive
empirical analysis of this issue based on a representative, national sample of data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics' (BLS) primary sampling frame for construction of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI).
Whether the poor pay more for food, and if so, why, is an issue of great importance for
recent discussions of public policies toward urban renewal, transfers to the urban poor, zoning
requirements for "superstores," and for theories of market structure.  The basic results indicate,
contrary to some previous studies, that the poor pay less for food items.
The empirical literature on the price gap between poor and affluent neighborhoods focuses
extensively on whether a price gap exists.  The results from this literature are mixed.  Groom
[1966] and Alcaly and Klevorick [1971] find no relationship between market prices and the average
income level of a neighborhood.  In contrast,  Kunreuther [1973] reports that low-income
neighborhoods have higher prices, while Ambrose [1979] finds lower prices.  More recent studies
also produce a medley of results.  Green [1991], Troutt [1993], and Frankel and Gould [1999] find
that low-income neighborhoods have prices that are significantly higher than those in more affluent
neighborhoods, while MacDonald and Nelson [1991] and Hayes [forthcoming] find no difference.
There is much less research examining why prices may differ (e.g., cost or quality differences).
Frankel and Gould [1999] find that higher prices are associated with greater income inequality.
Finke et al [1997] find that in urban areas, low-income blacks pay significantly more than higher
income blacks, and both low- and high-income whites.2
Most of the prior research examines market prices through case studies.  As a result, sample
sizes are small.  Further, the importance of the surveyed items in actual consumer baskets is often
unknown.  More importantly, a significant portion of the studies are based on improper survey
methodology--focusing on stores known to engage in unfair pricing strategies, selecting stores on
the basis of proximity to volunteer surveyors, or other non-random methods.
1
The ideal survey to answer this question would provide prices for representative poor and
affluent market baskets in both poor and affluent neighborhoods.  Data from such a survey would
allow researchers to study whether price differentials (if they exist) are due to where the poor shop
or what the poor buy relative to more affluent consumers.  Further, in such an ideal survey the
sample of stores would be the primary shopping venue of the household, ensuring that these data
match the demographic characteristics of the household to the survey outlet.  In addition to
accounting for consumer tastes in outlet and product selection, consumer costs would be collected
as well.  Most importantly, information pertaining to firm operating costs and quality (e.g.,
operating hours, the number of specialty departments) would also be obtained.
In this paper, I utilize price level data collected by the BLS to examine whether the poor pay
more for food and why.  In many ways, the price data mimic those from the ideal survey.  The
sample frame of stores is compiled from the universe of stores where consumers actually shop.  In
addition, the probability of selection of a particular product is proportional to its sales volume in the
outlet.  This allows both consumer behavior and supply factors to be accounted for simultaneously
in the analysis of a price differential.  I supplement the price level data with information on the
service offerings, pricing strategies, and other proxies for operating costs faced by the firm.  I find
                                                       
1 See e.g., Groom [1966], Alcaly  and Klevorick [1971], Kunreuther [1973], Ambrose [1979], Green [1991], and Troutt
[1993]. MacDonald and Nelson [1991] utilize data collected by the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.  While the data are from a random sample of stores, the market basket is not identical3
that the poor pay up to 6 percent less than their more affluent counterparts after accounting for
operating costs, quality, market structure, consumer search, and geographic variation.  Further, I
find that poor, predominantly white (non-Hispanic) neighborhoods and poor predominately
Hispanic black neighborhoods experience price discounts up to 9.6 and 18.3 percent, respectively,
while poor predominantly black (non-Hispanic) neighborhoods face the going price in affluent
white (non-Hispanic) neighborhoods.
A brief summary of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in sections 2 and 3 I present
the analytical framework and empirical strategy.  In section 4 I describe the data.  In section 5 I
report results on the existence of a price differential, evaluate the explanatory power of some
economic theories offered to explain the differential, and address alternative explanations for the
results.  In section 6 I discuss some concerns with my interpretation of the results and I conclude in
section 7.
2. Analytical Framework
Economic theory alone provides no clear answer as to whether the poor pay more for
commodities.  The neoclassical model under perfect competition and the Bertrand duopoly model
predict that firm prices should be the same in equilibrium (and equal to the marginal cost of the
homogenous good) regardless of geographical location.  However, the Bertrand model with product
differentiation and  Hotelling's spatial-monopoly model can generate higher prices in poor
neighborhoods.  (For other models that predict price differences see Rothschild [1974]; Butters
[1977]; Salop and Stiglitz [1977]; Varian [1980]; and Burdett and Judd [1983]).  In addition, there
are models of price discrimination and bargaining in which a gap in mean prices paid by different
                                                                                                                                                                                      
across stores as a result of item unavailability.  See Geithman and Marion [1993] for a critique of the ERS research
design and methodology and Hayes [2000] for a detailed discussion of the prior literature.4
groups may not exist, yet price discrimination occurs through differences in the variance of the
price distribution [Goldberg 1996].  As the sign of the differential is theoretically indeterminate,
this is an empirical question.
My empirical strategy is first to document whether prices differ between poor and affluent
neighborhoods and then to control for a number of factors that may affect equilibrium price
dispersion.
2  In this paper, price dispersion refers to the spread of prices attributable to differences
in costs, quality, information acquisition, or market structure.  This is a broad definition which
encompasses spatial price dispersion (the distribution of prices for an identical item across space)
and temporal dispersion (e.g., sales).
A. Operating Costs
  The operating costs of food retailers include the marginal costs associated with a sale,
quality-induced costs, and discretionary costs.  According to the Food Marketing Institute (FMI)
[1997], labor and rental property comprise 12 and 2 percent of sales, respectively.  FMI [1997]
estimates that payroll and employee benefits account for almost 54 percent of total operating cost
for food retailers---more than the cost of supplies and insurance premiums combined.  Labor costs
are particularly high in seafood, bakery, and foodservice specialty departments  [Supermarket
Business, 1998].  In addition to providing a service, specialty departments are proxies for the
quality of a supermarket.  For example, only large, modern supermarkets contain in-store bakeries
(where baking is done on the premises) and seafood counters.  Discretionary costs include
promotional activities, such as advertising, in-store demonstrations, and loyalty-card programs.
                                                       
2 The spread of prices for the same item is a well-documented phenomenon and economists have generated numerous
models that predict dispersed prices in equilibrium [Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Pratt et al 1979; Burdett and Judd 1983].5
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the average store characteristics in the U.S. and the
average characteristics for stores in the BLS sample that is analyzed in this paper.  A comparison of
columns (4) and (5) of the table shows that BLS sample stores operating in low-income areas
employ less labor and are less likely to be a branch of a chain.  Since chain status proxies for
economies of scale in purchasing, the lower proportion of chain stores may signal higher average
inventory costs for inner-city retailers.  Columns (4) and (5) of the table also show the average
discretionary costs and offered services for stores operating in low-income and high-income areas.
Stores operating in the inner-city are less likely to offer double-coupon, frequent shopper, and in-
store discount activities.  These activities encourage consumers to self-select into categories, which
results in efficient promotional targeting.  Not surprisingly, the greatest divergence between inner-
city stores and stores operating in affluent neighborhoods occurs in the quality of the shopping
experience.  On average, inner-city stores have fewer specialty departments and offer fewer
services.
B. Information Acquisition
   While the theoretical literature on consumer search behavior is extensive [see e.g., Nelson
1970; Butters 1977; Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Burdett and Judd 1983; and Diamond 1987], empirical
findings are limited.  Alcaly [1976] finds that search activity by income group is positively related
to the group's income elasticity of demand for the product.  In an empirical test of joint search using
food prices, Carlson and Gieseke [1983] find search behavior moderately increases for low-income
consumers.
    While theory predicts that increased search from an unchanging price distribution lowers
the average transaction price, it is an empirical question as to whether the poor search more.  As the6
wage rate rises, there are two competing forces influencing search.  Higher income increases the
opportunity cost of time and lowers search activity.  However, increased income also allows the
consumer to purchase better information from the market resulting in more search [Mincer 1963].
Further, direct costs (e.g., transportation costs) lower the marginal cost of search for the rich
relative to the poor.  So while the poor have a lower opportunity cost of time as measured by the
wage rate, it is not clear whether the poor engage in greater search for the same product [Alcaly
1976].
In my empirical analysis, I proxy search costs with the proportion of households without a
motor vehicle, the proportion of residents attaining a given educational level, and the number of
stores in the neighborhood (per square mile) interacted with the neighborhood poverty rate.
3  Table
1 shows descriptive statistics for these variables.  A comparison of columns (4) and (5) shows that
households residing in low-income areas are three times less likely to own a vehicle and residents
are almost twice as likely to drop out of high school.
C. Market Structure
   Supermarkets comprise 24 percent of all food retailers but account for 77 percent of total
food sales.  Convenience stores account for 45 percent of all retailers and 6 percent of total sales,
while wholesale clubs account for less than 1 percent of outlets but 5 percent of total sales.
4  The
supermarket industry is regionally competitive and dynamic. Regionally, more than 85
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) have four-firm concentration ratios in excess of 80 percent
                                                       
3 Determining the variables and functional form to characterize search rules empirically is very difficult and the
literature does not offer much guidance.  I experimented with a number of different specifications of search such as
accounting for the number of children in the household under age 5 (which should increase search costs) and the
proportion of single parents.  In my empirical work I assume search costs to be linear in income and transportation
costs, and non-linear in education.
4 Progressive Grocer [1999], p.10.  Limited assortment stores, which sell less than 1,500 items, primarily dry grocery,
with few (if any) perishables, account for the remainder of total sales.7
[Geithman and Marion 1993].
5 Nationwide, the top four companies account for 20 percent of
annual sales and almost 20 percent of individual supermarkets.
6  Despite the fact that four
companies own a large share of individual stores, supermarkets are not very concentrated
nationally; Albertson's acquisition of American Stores in 1998 made it the first supermarket with
operations coast to coast.
7  Finally, the industry is constantly changing due to an average of 54
mergers/acquisitions each year [Kinsey 1998].  However, the  number of stores remains fairly
constant as entry and exit are nearly equal [USDA 1996].
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the means of the market structure variables I use in the
empirical analysis.  Surprisingly, columns (4) and (5) of the table show that there are significantly
more stores (per square mile) in the inner-city than in more affluent neighborhoods, although these
stores are smaller on average.
3. Empirical Framework
Measuring the net price differential
My empirical strategy is to try to account for variation in price levels due to costs and
quality so as to isolate the relationship between the neighborhood income level and market prices.
To begin, I first estimate price differentials by analyzing market prices in poor and rich
neighborhoods for homogenous products.  Because theory provides little guidance on the functional
form, I estimate the following semi-log model:
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where ai ” qi/Q is firm i’s market share and the firms are ordered such that a1‡…‡a4‡…‡an.
6 Food Industry Review [1998].  In 1998 the top four food retailers were Albertsons, Inc., The Kroger Co., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., and Safeway, Inc.8
, ln 1 ijzst s ijst jzs zs i ijzst Z X Poor p u w b g + + F + P + + = (1)
where pijzst is the unit price plus applicable sale taxes of item i in store j located in neighborhood z,
in local area s, at time t; gi is the item fixed effect; Poorzs is an indicator variable which equals 1 if
the neighborhood is low-income; Xjzs represents a set of covariates (operating and discretionary
costs, consumer search, quality, market structure, and neighborhood demographics); Zijst is a set of
other covariates to be discussed below; ws is the local area fixed effect; and uijzst is a random error
term that can be decomposed into:
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This error structure allows for the correlation of item prices within a store j.  The approach
most used in the literature omits covariates Xjzs and Zijst from specification (1).
I also analyze the effect of the interaction between race/ethnicity and residence in a low-
income neighborhood on neighborhood price levels by estimating the following model:
( ) , * ln 1 ijzst s ijst jzs zs zs zs zs i ijzst Z X Poor R R Poor p u w b g + + F + P + Y + G + + = (4)
where Rzs represents race and ethnicity indicator variables and Y is the vector of coefficients on the
race/ethnicity and poor interaction terms.
In models (1) and (4), income plays a multiple role making the interpretation of b1 less
straightforward.  Income at once represents an identifiable characteristic, which may be used by
retailers to segment consumers for price discrimination (i.e., in the sense of Pigou [1920]), in
                                                                                                                                                                                      
7 There is no consensus as to whether concentration increases price in this industry.  The most comprehensive studies
find polar results.  See  Marion et al [1979] and Kaufman and Handy [1989].9
addition to representing gross demand and the cost of search.
8  Despite embodying these multiple
effects, one would only expect the coefficient b1 to be positive for a limited number of reasons.  For
example, assuming the good is normal, the first possibility is for the search effect to dominate the
income effect in such a way that the rich search more à la Mincer [1963] and pay lower prices.
However, Rothschild [1974] and others provide strong arguments against this possibility.  The
second, and more plausible, possibility is price discrimination, in which the seller captures some
consumer surplus from the captive market.
Measuring item dispersion
  Equation (1) estimates the average net price differential across poor neighborhood types.
While the average net price difference is informative, it has two potential drawbacks for this
analysis.  First, the average price differential constrains the relationship between price and the
income status of a neighborhood to be the same for each item.  Since anecdotal evidence suggests
that item prices vary widely, this constraint may be unreasonable.  Second, the weighting scheme
employed in the estimation of the average price differential does not account for the relative
importance of items in the market basket of poor consumers.  Therefore, to analyze item price
dispersion across neighborhood types, I also estimate a modified version of specification (1) by
item for the poor and rich separately:
, ln 0 ijzst s ijst jzs zs i ijzst Z X I p u w b a ¢ + ¢ + F¢ + P¢ + ¢ + =   (5)
                                                       
8 Price discrimination exists if (and only if) the same variety of a commodity is sold to two different buyers at different
net prices [Phlips 1983].  In order for price discrimination to be a viable strategy, a retailer must have market power, a
means to segment the market, and the ability to prevent resale.  The first condition is no longer interpreted in the strong
sense of absolute monopoly power (see e.g.,  Greenhut and  Greenhut [1975] and Norman [1981]).  Duopolists,
oligopolists, and small competitors in differentiated markets can practice price discrimination.  Price discrimination by
inner-city food retailers may be facilitated by the possession of some monopoly power through the lack of effective
competition, the ability to sort consumers according to their intensity of demand (known from food stamp or other10
where  Izs is the median household income of the neighborhood  z.  While I can compare the
differences in bi between the poor and the rich for item i, such a difference does not measure the
concept of differential prices discussed in the popular press.  This is because high prices for certain
goods may be offset by low prices for other goods across neighborhood types.  The usual concept
of a price gap seeks to capture a situation in which the net result of all pricing strategies is higher
prices in poor neighborhoods.  To address this, I derive an aggregate measure that weights the price








i i poor s b b   (6)
where si is the relevant food category expenditure share for low-income consumers taken from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), and  i b¢ ˆ  refers to the estimated price difference in
specification (5).
In summary, I first examine mean gross price differences and relative dispersion.  My
regression analysis begins by estimating the relationship between the market price and income level
of the neighborhood using prices for homogenous items priced in almost every sampling area.  I
initially impose restrictions on the price relationship (the price differential is assumed to be the
same across sampling areas, as are operating costs and other  covariates), then relax the
assumptions.  In my most general specification, I derive an overall measure of the relationship
between price and income that is simply the weighted-average of the individual item differences,
where the weights are item budget-shares.  This final measure,  b, can be interpreted as the price
                                                                                                                                                                                      
welfare redemption, information from shopper club plans, etc.), and the practice of quantity restrictions on discounted
items.  A corollary to the second condition is that the intensity of demand must actually differ across segmented groups.11
differential which accounts for the relative importance of items to the low-income consumer.  A
comparison of  poor b  to  rich b  yields another measure of the price differential.
4. Data
I. BLS Data
The BLS collects the price data analyzed in this paper to compile the monthly CPI.  The
BLS data are uniquely suited for the analysis of income price differentials for several reasons.
First, the prices are national in scope.  The BLS selects 87 urban regions in the U.S. to survey based
upon various demographic factors.
9  Map 1 shows the distribution of BLS survey areas.  Although
the survey is limited to urban areas (encompassing 86 percent of the population), the map shows
sampling areas to be geographically diverse.  Second, the BLS prices are representative of where
consumers shop and what they actually purchase.  This is because the sampling strategy derives the
frame of survey outlets from the Telephone Point of Purchase Survey (TPOPS), a separate
unpublished consumer survey.  Once the outlet is selected based upon total expenditures, the
unique item to price is selected using probability proportional to sales.
10  These selection
techniques imbed consumer behavior in the collected price, which is essentially the market price.
Another benefit of the BLS sample is that prices are collected from a variety of neighborhood
types, allowing the study of the average poor consumer.  Finally, the BLS weights price indices to
be representative of the nation.  Therefore using their sample, properly weighted, results in
representative national price differentials.
                                                       
9 The primary sampling units are chosen to be representative of the current U.S. demography [Williams 1996] and are
selected based upon the following factors the BLS finds to be highly correlated with price change: region, population
size, mean interest and dividend income per housing unit, mean wage and salary income per housing unit, percent of
housing units heated by electricity, percent of housing units heated by fuel oil, percent black, and percent retired.  See
BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 17.
10 See the Data Appendix for details on the BLS sampling strategy.12
One potential drawback of the BLS data is that the same item is not priced everywhere,
raising concerns of comparability.  I avoid comparing "apples and oranges" by limiting my analysis
to five homogenous items surveyed in the majority of sampling areas.  Another concern is related
to the unique item selection process, which does not account for product availability.  For example,
it is not fair to compare Brand 1 flour at store 1 to prices at other stores when store 1 only stocks
Brand 1.  This procedure is appropriate for a price index reflecting inflation, but is a concern for
comparing price differentials because the lack of choice can be regarded as a price premium.  If
product choice is positively correlated with the neighborhood income level, then my estimate of the
net price differential will be upward biased.  This is a real possibility as stores in low-income
neighborhoods tend to be substantially smaller than average.
I limit my analysis to prices from the food and beverages major group of the CPI.  I further
limit my sample to the following products: whole chicken, eggs, milk, bananas, oranges, and
lettuce.
11  The analysis sample consists of 10,170 prices from 2,181 stores in 43 states over the 12
months of 1998.
12  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 compare the means for selected demographics of
my analysis sample to all neighborhoods in the U.S.  As expected, the analysis sample differs
significantly from the average neighborhood in the U.S. in dimensions that reflect the CPI's goal of
tracking inflation in urban areas.
13
                                                       
11 This group of products is priced in almost all survey areas.  This sample is derived from a larger, more heterogenous
sample of products including flour, white bread, ground beef, pork chops, bananas, potatoes, non-carbonated juice, and
salad.  This larger sample consists of 63,557 prices from 2,181 stores.  The analysis of this sample yields qualitatively
similar results.  See the Data Appendix for details.
12 The BLS does not survey Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming.  Further, my analysis sample does not contain
stores in Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and West Virginia because the homogenous items in the sample are
not surveyed in these states.
13 There are no significant differences when the BLS sample is compared to all urban neighborhoods in the U.S.13
II. Outlet information
Since the price data contain only address information and store type, I supplement them
with more extensive data from SPECTRA, Inc., a private marketing firm.
14  The SPECTRA sample
consists of 19,836 observations on supermarkets, grocery stores, and large-scale discounters and
provides information on service offerings, outlet size, and costs.  Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 report
the means of selected  covariates for the BLS sample and the  subsample for which I have
SPECTRA data.  The subsample generally resembles the entire BLS sample.
15  I use additional data
from InfoUsa, Inc., a private marketing firm, to derive measures of competition from the number of
stores in a zip code.  I use the 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 3B, to obtain demographic data by
zip code.
III. Defining the poor
Defining the poor is not a straight-forward task, as there are a number of ways to classify a
household as being poor, such as being cash poor, food and clothing poor, or being subject to
detrimental social conditions as in Wilson [1987].  In the empirical work below, I analyze different
definitions of the poor based on various percentiles of the state poverty rate.  Poverty percentiles
based on each state's distribution of poverty are relative measures, which is important to note
because the composition of the poor changes with the distribution rate used.  Alternate distributions
include the U.S. population and the distribution of poverty in the BLS sample.  However, the
results are qualitatively the same regardless of the poverty rate distribution used.
16  Therefore, for
                                                       
14 The match rate is approximately 78 percent.  In adherence to the confidentially of the data, I do not reveal outlet
names and product brands in this analysis.
15 See Appendix Table 1 for a comparison of the full SPECTRA sample to the BLS outlet sample. The table reveals
that the SPECTRA sample consists of stores of various sizes located in a diverse set of neighborhoods.
16 At issue is a choice about absolute versus relative poverty.  For example, percentiles based upon the distribution of
poverty across the U.S. population are an absolute measure of poverty.14
comparative purposes, most of the empirical work below defines the poor as households residing in
neighborhoods in which more than 20 percent of the residents are below the state poverty level.
III. Racial and ethnic composition
  I measure the racial and ethnic composition of a neighborhood using dummy variables
based upon segregation indices calculated at the county level.  I utilize the dissimilarity [Duncan
and Duncan 1955] and isolation [Bell 1954] indices.
17  The dissimilarity index proxies whether two
groups are evenly distributed throughout an area.  The index varies from 0 to 1 and is minimized
when all parts of a county have the same relative number of minority and majority members as the
county as a whole.  At a value of 1, minority members live in completely different areas of a county
than majority members.  The index of isolation measures the extent to which minority members
interact with only minority members.  It is intended to capture the characteristic of exposure.  The
index of isolation is minimized when the minority group is a relatively small proportion of the
county, so that the minority group will have to interact in some capacity with the majority.
18  This
index also varies from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a greater isolation from the majority
population.  I define a predominantly black county as one in which the index of isolation exceeds
0.3.
19  Similarly, I define a predominantly Hispanic county as one in which the Hispanic index of
isolation exceeds 0.3.  In the empirical work below, I refer to "black neighborhoods" and "Hispanic
                                                       
17 Segregation indices are used extensively in the sociology literature.  The index definitions I use are based upon
Massey and Denton [1988].  See the Data Appendix for the mathematical definitions.
18 While I utilize the conventional dissimilarity and isolation indices only, Massey and Denton [1988] propose three
other indices intended to capture the concentration, centralization, and clustering aspects of segregation. As these
indices require detailed geographic information, I cannot use these indices in the analysis.
19 I have experimented with a number of alternative definitions, including defining a predominantly black
neighborhood as one in which the index of dissimilarity exceeds 0.6 and the index of isolation exceeds 0.3---the
definition used in Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor [1997].  See Table 2 for comparisons.  The proportion of counties
satisfying this condition differs from that in Cutler, Glaeser, and Vidgor [1997] because of my use of zip codes as my
neighborhood proxy and the calculation of segregation at the county level.  See the Data Appendix for details.15




As noted earlier, Table 1 presents the means of the covariates I use to represent the factors
that may influence price levels.  I group the covariates according to the primary mechanism through
which they may affect price.  The top rows of Table 1 show the means of the various racial and
ethnic neighborhood classifications I use.  The top-most five rows show the proportion of
predominantly black or Hispanic counties in the BLS sample as a whole in column (2) and by
poverty status in columns (4) and (5).  Neighborhoods located in predominantly black counties are
significantly more likely to be poor than affluent, using either measure of racial composition.  This
is also true for predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods.
The remainder of Table 1 shows the means of the other cost, consumer search, quality, and
market structure  covariates.  Given that most of the variables that proxy search costs are
significantly different for the poor, it is likely that search may explain a portion of the price
patterns.  In terms of the operating cost variables, stores operating in non-poor neighborhoods
provide quicker checkout as measured by the number of available cashiers, greater availability of
service or replenishment of products as represented by the number of full- and part-time workers,
and on average, more opportunities to enjoy discount prices.  Although crime is significantly higher
in poor areas, the table indicates that it is more costly to do business in non-poor areas.
20
                                                       
20 Insurance costs for supermarkets comprise less than 0.5 percent of sales [FMI 1997].  Even if insurance costs were
50 percent higher for stores operating in low-income areas, such costs would continue to be smaller in magnitude and
importance than labor, utilities, and supplies.16
II. Mean gross price differences
   I limit my analysis to five homogenous items--milk, whole chicken, eggs, navel oranges,
and Iceberg lettuce--that are priced in most sampling areas.  Table 2 shows the mean (gross) price
differences for these items by alternative definitions of poor neighborhoods.  The first panel of the
table defines the poor as households residing in neighborhoods in which more than 20 percent of
the residents are beneath the poverty line.  Using this definition, the poor pay less for chicken (10
cents less) and eggs (7 cents less).  The table shows that there is a significant discount for chicken
(6 cents lower) and eggs (12 cents lower) when poor neighborhoods are defined as being in the
80th percentile of the state poverty distribution.  The significance of the discount for eggs
disappears when the definition of poor changes to the 90th percentile of the state poverty
distribution.  Under this definition, the only significant difference is for poultry, where the price is
9 cents lower per pound in poor neighborhoods.  When prices are allowed to vary nonlinearly
across neighborhood types, there is a statistically significant difference in orange and lettuce prices
of 16 and 10 cents per pound, respectively, between the first and fourth quintiles (where the first
quintile consists of the most affluent neighborhoods).  This suggests that the poor pay less for these
goods.  Similarly, concentrated poverty neighborhoods (as represented by the fifth quintile) have
prices different from those in the first quintile only for eggs, with eggs being 14 cents cheaper in
poor neighborhoods.  All other differences are not statistically significant.
The last column shows a weighted-sum of the average item prices, where the weights are
the category expenditure shares for low-income consumers taken from the CEX.  Although the
individual item averages fluctuate, the overall basket cost is negative and significant for three of the
five poverty definitions.17
Two patterns are evident in this table.  First, all of the price differences are either zero or
negative, indicating that market prices are likely to be lower in poor neighborhoods.  Second, the
small significant differences that do appear are not constant across definitions, indicating that the
gross price discounts are not robust to alternative definitions of the poor.  The last panel of the table
shows essentially no price differences across the poverty distribution for milk, chicken, and eggs.
In fact, the last quintile (which is equivalent to 80th percentile of the state poverty distribution) is
sufficient to model the relationship between price and neighborhood income status based on F-tests
(by item) constraining the dummy variables for the other quintiles to be zero.  However, this is not
true for oranges and lettuce, which show differences in other quintiles.
In short, a clear pattern of differences in mean gross prices between poor and affluent
neighborhoods is not evident.  However, this result may not be true throughout the price
distribution and/or the variation in prices may differ across neighborhoods.  For example, Goldberg
[1996] finds no mean difference between the prices paid by white and black males for automobiles,
but the variance in prices paid suggest the presence of price discrimination.  To investigate relative
dispersion across neighborhood types, I calculate the difference in the cumulative density functions
of the neighborhood gross prices.
21  Figure 1 shows the dispersion in gross prices for poor and
affluent neighborhoods for milk, chicken, and lettuce.  The price distribution in poor neighborhoods
appears to lie to the left of both the mean and the price distribution in affluent neighborhoods.  The
poor-affluent difference in the cumulative density functions (CDFs) is positive and significant for
all items based on a F-test, indicating a greater likelihood of lower prices in poor neighborhoods.
22
In summary, gross prices do not appear to be higher in poor neighborhoods.  If anything, it
appears that gross market prices may be lower on average in low-income neighborhoods.  In the
                                                       
21 I calculate the kernel density estimates of the gross prices using the Epanechnikov kernel.
22 The CDFs are measured by summing the item price density functions.18
next section I attempt to explain these patterns in gross prices by differences in operating costs,
quality, and consumer search.  As I begin to add covariates in subsequent work below, I follow the
literature and define poor neighborhoods as those in which more than 20 percent of the households
are below the poverty level (i.e., the first 3 rows of Table 2).
III. Explaining the (non-)existence of a price gap
Table 3 isolates the relationship between price and poverty composition from other factors
such as costs, quality, and consumer search by sequentially adding other covariates.  The top panel
of the table shows the average poor price differential.  All regressions include a constant, month
dummies, item and local area fixed effects.  In addition, with the exception of column (1), all
regressions include product size and a dummy variable for whether the price is a sale price.  These
latter variables comprise the Zijst in equation (1).
As indicated by comparing mean prices in Table 2, the poor pay approximately 6 percent
less for these goods.  Controlling for neighborhood demographics and crime increases the discount,
while the other factors decrease the discount.  Each change in the discount from the prior column
occurs in the expected direction for all of the factors.  For example, when discretionary costs are
unaccounted for in column (5), the price differential is larger than when such costs are included as
in column (6).  The final column shows that after accounting for many factors to represent price
dispersion, the net price gap is about the same size as the gross price gap but the difference is now
insignificant.
23
Overall, the results suggest that the price differential can be explained by differences in
costs, as the statistical significance of the average poor price gap disappears after controlling for a
                                                       
23 I obtain similar results when I conduct the analysis with a continuous measure of neighborhood income.19
number of cost factors.   However, the robust negative price difference provides some evidence that
third-degree (classical) price discrimination [Pigou 1920] may play a role in the explanation as
well.  This is because the price discount may be a result of firms reacting strategically to the higher
demand elasticities of poor consumers with lower prices.
24  In addition, the results appear to be
consistent with imperfect information models that relate relative prices paid to search costs (see
e.g., Salop and Stiglitz, 1977).
IV. Item price dispersion
The analysis performed above estimated empirical specification (1) outlined in section 3, in
which the item characteristics are constrained to be the same across neighborhood types. This
procedure is most similar to what has been done in the literature and is the conventional approach
for this type of survey data (see e.g., Primont and Kokoski 1990, 1991).  Two main conclusions can
be drawn from the results presented.  First, the poor coefficients are generally negative or zero.
Second, the covariates contribute significantly to explaining the variation in prices and the point
estimates are fairly robust to their inclusion.  However, as the number of variables in the models
presented are large (e.g., there are 123 model degrees of freedom in the model estimated in column
(9), Table 3), the pattern of interactions among the product characteristics is unknown.  In order to
allow the price differential and product characteristics to vary freely, I follow an alternative
weighting strategy which allows each item price to fluctuate within each neighborhood type.  I do
this by estimating empirical specification (5) by item for each neighborhood type and deriving a
weighted-sum of poor-price differentials from each model using the poor expenditure shares taken
                                                       
24 Hoch et al [1995] estimate food demand elasticities and find low-income consumers to be more sensitive to price
changes.20
from the CEX as weights.
25  Because I evaluate the price gap for poor and affluent neighborhoods
separately (using the definition of poor noted above), I substitute a continuous measure of
neighborhood income (e.g., median household income) for the poor indicator variables used in the
above analysis.
26
I show the averages with and without covariates for the homogeneous items in Table 4.  The
coefficient on median household income varies a great deal across items and by neighborhood type.
For example, in column (2) milk prices increase significantly (25 percent) as income increases one
unit, or 10,000 dollars, for the poor but column (12) shows no relationship between income and
price for milk in affluent areas.  In general, the variation across items is enlarged by the inclusion of
the full set of covariates, showing that the importance of the covariates differs across items.
The bottom panel of the table calculates the weighted average of the income coefficients
(b), with and without  covariates.  The weighted-average of the income coefficients without
covariates for the poor neighborhoods is essentially zero.  The result of no relationship between the
median household income of a neighborhood and market prices has been reported by a number of
researchers (e.g., Groom [1966] and  Alcaly and  Klevorick [1971]).  However, the weighted-
average of the income coefficients with  covariates for the poor neighborhoods is large and
significantly different from zero, indicating that prices increase 42.7 percent as median household
income increases by 10,000 dollars.  This is in contrast to the weighted-coefficient in affluent
neighborhoods, which is negative and insignificant.  I interpret these results as suggesting that
prices are more sensitive to income in poor areas, conditional on  covariates.  The difference
                                                       
25 Consumer Expenditure Survey [1997], Table 2.
26 I use this measure in lieu of the continuous poverty rate because of collinearity problems in the poor neighborhood
sample.  Multicollinearity is encountered in this procedure because of the smaller sample sizes and relatively large set
of covariates.21
( ) poor rich b b -  indicates that, given a 10,000 increase in the income level of a neighborhood, prices
are more likely to increase.
27
The weighted-coefficients  b verify the earlier results.  In more concentrated poverty areas,
the poor do not face higher prices.  Although the pricing strategies in relation to income differ
across products, these strategies do not result in higher prices in the inner-city.  One interpretation
of this is that price discrimination may be a local phenomenon: stores may exploit poor consumers
for some products but on average this practice does not result in the entire market basket price
being higher than in affluent areas.
The results from this approach are not qualitatively different from those reported above,
suggesting that the constraints are not substantively binding in specification (1).  Therefore, I return
to specification (1) to evaluate the influence of other factors unaccounted for above.
V. Other explanations
        The results from the comparison of means and the above regression analysis indicate that the
net price discount in poor neighborhoods ranges between zero and 6.1 percent.  While informative,
this is a large range so it is helpful to examine other possible explanations that may affect the net
price differential.  One such explanation is the format of the store.  While the above analysis
accounted for the possible economies of scale experienced by chain stores, I did not explicitly
account for differences in prices across store formats, which may be substantial.  For example,
while both Wal-Mart and Kroger's are chain stores they practice very different pricing strategies.
28
                                                       
27 I have also conducted this analysis on a larger, more heterogeneous sample of items.  The results are qualitatively the
same.
28 Wal-Mart employs  a everyday low price strategy, while Kroger focuses more extensively on a hi-low pricing
strategy.  This example should not be construed to imply that prices from either Wal-Mart or Kroger's are represented
in the data.22
Table 5 examines whether prices differ by the type of store.  A superstore has at least
30,000 square feet in retail space and annual sales in excess of 12 million dollars.  Superstores offer
a variety of specialty departments and services.  A conventional supermarket is any full-line, self-
service grocery store with annual sales of 2 million or more.
29  The table reveals significant
differences across store types for the homogenous items, with discounts in poor neighborhoods at
superstores (23 percent).  There are negligible differences at other store types.  The evidence
suggests that superstores located in low-income neighborhoods offer larger savings than
conventional supermarkets.
Another explanation that may affect the net price differential is the location of a store in a
central city.  Since poor households (especially poor, black households) tend to live in central cities
and higher prices in central cities is reported in prior work [McDonald and Nelson 1991], the 6.1
percent discount reported in the last column of Table 3 may be upward biased.  Columns (4) and
(5) of Table 5 show estimates of the net price differential for central city and suburban
neighborhoods.
30  The differentials are insignificant in both the central city and suburbs, and not
statistically different from one another.  In contrast to MacDonald and Nelson [1991], I find no
difference in the price differential between poor central city and poor suburban neighborhoods.
Though the regressions presented above allow for sampling area fixed effects, regional
variation may also affect differentials, as in certain regions (e.g., the south)  the cost of living is low
and the poverty rate is high, possibly inducing a downward bias in the estimate of the poor price
differential.  I investigate regional variation in columns (6)-(9) of Table 5.  Generally, prices are
                                                       
29 Store format information is based on data from Spectra Marketing, Inc.  While I do not know the actual store format
from the Spectra data for the stores in column (3) of the table, the operating names indicate that this column contains
bakeries, delicatessens, vegetable stores, independent supermarkets, etc.  Estimates for warehouses are omitted due to
collinearity between the poor indicator variable and other covariates.
30 I define an area as being located in a central city if the zip code of the store is located in a MSA declared a central
city by the Office of Management and Budget in June 1996.23
lower for the poor when the differences are allowed to vary by region and the largest discounts for
the poor occur in the Midwest (26 percent) and the south (10 percent).
Another potentially important factor affecting the price differential may be the racial/ethnic
composition of the neighborhood.  Race/ethnicity may matter if retailers charge higher prices in
certain neighborhoods because of the perceived higher cost of conducting business.  This may
result in Becker [1957] discrimination, in which retailers act as if ci(1+dk) were the true marginal
cost of providing item i, where dk is the discrimination coefficient against group k.
31  In columns
(10) -(13) I analyze the effect of racial and ethnic neighborhood composition on the poor price
differential.  Column (10) shows that neighborhoods primarily comprised of black residents have
market prices similar to those in neighborhoods comprised mostly of affluent, white residents.
Insignificant discounts in market prices are evident in neighborhoods where the predominant group
is either white (non-Hispanic) or of Hispanic ethnicity.
32  In contrast, there is a large, significant
discount in neighborhoods that are jointly black and Hispanic.  This discount remains after
accounting for the region, central city status, and store composition in the neighborhood.   One
possible explanation of this pattern is "reverse" Becker-type discrimination.
33  As stores in poor
Hispanic, black neighborhoods are likely to be owned by Hispanics [Bates 1985], the price discount
could reflect a preference to serve one's own community.
                                                       
31 Becker-style discrimination differs from classical price discrimination in that it results in differential prices for non-
economic reasons; price differences are not driven by differences in the costs of service or differences in the intensity















where aj is firm j's market share and e is the elasticity of demand (which is the same for all consumers).  Only dk
differentiates him from his competition and dk  is unrelated to marginal costs or demand intensities.
32 Hispanic ethnicity can be of any race.  I define a predominately Hispanic neighborhood in the table as one in which
the race is predominately white.
33 While classical price discrimination by race/ethnicity is possible, I assume that retailers cannot segment their market
on the basis of race/ethnicity (i.e., race/ethnicity is not identifiable through sales receipts) and demand intensities do not
vary by race.  These two assumptions render discrimination by race/ethnicity less profitable than a nondiscriminatory24
6. Caveats
  There are several caveats that should be kept in mind when interpreting the above results.
First, zip codes may not be a good proxy for the neighborhood since zip codes are delineated by the
U.S. Postal Service to ensure efficient delivery of the mail.  The boundaries are not intended to
reflect the amenities and characteristics that may distinguish one neighborhood from another.  A
related potential problem is the use of county level segregation measures.  In general, aerial units
used to measure segregation are arbitrary and indices calculated from different units will differ in
their correlation and magnitude--a problem known as aggregation bias.  Since zip codes are larger
than census tracts (another proxy for neighborhood) in urban areas, my indices of segregation may
be smaller because of less racial and ethnic concentration and homogeneity [Massey and Denton
1988].  As a result, my estimates of the net price differential across racial and ethnic neighborhood
types may be a lower bound of the true range.
The second source of bias arises from unmodeled mobility.  I identify the price effects using
intra-area variation, but I do not account for geographic mobility by households.  If less mobile
blacks choose to live in concentrated counties and mobility is positively correlated with price
(which may occur because more mobile people may be younger, wealthier, or may have a higher
value for amenities such as specialty coffees), then my estimate of the net price differential may be
downward biased.  In this case, poor black neighborhoods may have higher prices than affluent
white neighborhoods.  Cross-neighborhood shopping may induce a related source of potential bias.
Since consumers can theoretically shop anywhere, the relationship between neighborhood income
and price may be weakened.   One possible fix for this problem of measurement error in the
poverty status variables is to use the average income of the store's patronizing consumers as the
                                                                                                                                                                                      
pricing strategy.  In contrast, classical price discrimination is at least as profitable as a nondiscriminatory policy due to
the extraction of consumer surplus [Phlips 1983].25
income measure.  While the BLS sample frame represents where consumers shop, the information
linking the income of the correspondent to the store patronized is not currently available.
The third source of bias arises from unmodeled product availability.  As the BLS survey
does not explicitly account for product breadth in its multi-level probability of selection technique,
I cannot control for this source of variation in item prices.  This is a potentially important omission
because the lack of variety can be modeled as a price premium.  Further, since smaller stores
necessarily lack extensive variety and smaller stores are more likely to be located in poor and
predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhoods, my net price differential may be downward
biased.  However, I believe that the full effect of this source of bias is mitigated by my inclusion of
store quality characteristics since larger stores offering a mix of auxiliary services are more likely
to have large varieties of every product.
Finally, the analysis sample is comprised largely of perishable items for which quality
differences may exist despite the characteristic controls.  However, the sample composition does
not appear to drive the main results as I have conducted the analysis in Table 4 across a mixture of
items.
34  The analysis shows that the relationship between the prices of fresh fruit and meat and
income is not systematically different from that of the non-perishable items.
7. Conclusion
   This analysis looks at price differences and attempts to estimate whether there is a price gap
between poor and affluent neighborhoods both before and after controlling for factors such as costs,
quality, and consumer search.  Although there are many ways to define the poor, I find that
independent of classification, the most deprived neighborhoods in the U.S. do not face higher
                                                       
34 I conduct the analysis on a larger, more heterogenous sample of items that include non-carbonated juice, coffee, and
flour.26
market prices for goods.  In fact, I find that the poor face discounted net prices that can be as much
as 6 percent lower than those faced by the more affluent.  In addition, I find that store format is an
important determinant of price differences, with large discounts available for the poor at
superstores.  Although I analyze only 5 items, the results likely extend to a variety of foods that are
prepared at home by virtue of the BLS survey strategy.
The price gap appears to be most consistent with price dispersion generated by various costs
to both the consumer and the firm.  Quality differences and consumer search, in particular, go far in
explaining price differences between stores both within and between different neighborhood types.
While price dispersion accounts for much of the observed variation in prices, it does not completely
explain the price gap as significant discounts remain for some poor subgroups.  One possible
explanation for the robust significant discounts is classical price discrimination.  The results
presented are consistent with food stores offering discounts to those consumers who may have
greater price elasticities of demand.
Finally, while poor (non-Hispanic) white and predominantly Hispanic, black neighborhoods
have market prices considerably lower than those in affluent (non-Hispanic) white neighborhoods
for some items, net prices in poor, predominantly black neighborhoods do not significantly differ.
This result is robust to the definition of poor and to the item.  The lack of a difference by race may
reflect omitted variables (e.g., the race of the store owners, consumer mobility, etc.) or suggest
there is no difference.27
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9. Data Appendix
Commodities and Services Database (C&S)
   The Commodities and Services Database (C&S) contains the prices collected by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) for use in the compilation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The CPI is
designed to measure the (monthly) change in prices of goods and services purchased by typical
urban American consumers.  It is calculated by comparing the cost of a fixed set of goods and
services at current prices with the cost of an identical market basket at prices prevailing during a
reference period.  Price data are collected from a survey of stores without regard to coupon use or
special discounts (i.e. senior citizen and quantity discounts).  However, the survey does collect sale
prices when they are available to every consumer.
The BLS maintains price information at several levels of aggregation.  See Appendix Figure
1 for a schematic diagram.  Prices are available for eight major groups: food and beverages;
housing; apparel; transportation; medical care; recreation; education and communication; and other
goods and services.  These groups represent the highest level of price aggregation.  Within each
major group items are arranged according to expenditure classes (e.g., cereal and cereal products,
bakery products, etc.) in order to group like products and to allow imputation of price change for
the CPI when actual prices are unavailable.  Within each expenditure class are item strata (e.g.,
flour and prepared flour mixes, cereal, etc.), which are generally a group of products that are
expected to have similar price movements (Lane (1996),  p. 19).  The lowest level of aggregation is
entry-level items--the products surveyed in stores (e.g., flour, cereal, rice, etc.). The C&S Database
contains price information for the 69 expenditure categories that comprise the 8 major groups,
which in turn are divided into 207 item strata and 364 ELIs (BLS Handbook of Methods (1997), p.
178).  Price data are collected monthly for the food and beverages major group and bimonthly for
all other major groups.
The price survey samples 87 geographic areas referred to as primary sampling units (PSUs)
which comprise most of the contiguous states, as well as Alaska and Hawaii (BLS Handbook of
Methods (1997), p.177).  Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are not sampled.  The frame of
outlet respondents is obtained from the Telephone Point-of-Purchase Survey (TPOPS), an
unpublished supplemental survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census under contract with the
BLS. The TPOPS questions qualified households about where they typically shop for a number of
commodities and the amount they expend.  Eligible households for the TPOPS include all civilian,
non-institutional persons, including persons residing in boarding houses, housing facilities for
students and workers, mobile home parks, permanent-type living quarters in hotels and motels, and
staff residing in institutions (BLS Handbook of Methods (1997), p. 179).  The probability of outlet
selection for the price survey is proportional to consumer expenditures derived from the TPOPS.
The unique item (i.e., brand, size, etc.) is chosen through disaggregation--a multistage probability
sampling procedure in which all goods within an entry-level item category are given a probability
for selection in proportion to their dollar sales in the store (U.S. Department of Labor, Consumer
Price Index C&S Initiation Data Collection Manual, January 1998, Chapter 6, p. 1).
As a result of this sampling strategy, each item strata is surveyed in every PSU, but different
unique items are selected in each store.  Thus, the market basket differs across sampling units
precluding the comparison of identical market basket prices in this study.  I use the itemized
specification list completed after disaggregation to create indicator variables for the hedonic
regressions I compute.31
Analysis Sample
   The data used in this study are derived from the C&S Database for the food and beverages
major group.  The sample includes 19 expenditure categories, 65 item strata, and 92 entry-level
items. Data were extracted for the period covering January 1998 to December 1998 for the food at
home  item strata.  All prices are analyzed at the entry-level item level in this paper.  The sample
averages approximately 42,500 monthly price observations from 4,790 stores. The sample contains
only the last nine monthly observations of round steak due to a coding error and subsequent
archiving of the data. These omissions exclude 4,740 observations---less than 1 percent of the
extracted sample.
I use several other criteria to limit the sample.  First, I select only observations that are
available for use in the final compilation of the CPI.  This eliminates prices collected for evaluation
purposes such as experimental indices, reducing the sample by 104,295 observations or 22 percent.
Second, I eliminate price quotes that are flagged as "awaiting central office clearance,"
"temporarily unavailable to be priced in outlet," "out-of-season," "outlet status unknown," or
"deletion of price quote pending" to insure price quotes are obtained from established outlets.  This
affects 12 observations.  I further limit the sample to outlets for which food may be purchased for
home preparation and consumption. This criterion excludes food service establishments such as
restaurants, cafeterias, and food vending machines, effecting 30,327 observations.  Overall, these
combined criteria reduce the initial sample size by 134,544 observations or approximately 30
percent.  In this paper I focus on the following items only: flour, white bread, ground beef, pork
chops, whole chicken, eggs, milk, bananas, oranges, potatoes, lettuce, salad, and non-carbonated
juice.  My usable sample from the BLS consists of 63,557 observations from 2,181 outlets across
1,813 zip codes in 43 states.     Survey data are collected from outlets and respondents on a
voluntary basis and are confidential.  In adherence to this confidentially, I do not reveal outlet
names and product brands in this analysis.
Marketing Data
   Because the C&S Database contains only cursory data on outlets, specifically name,
address, and phone number, I supplement it with more extensive data from SPECTRA, Inc., a
private marketing firm in Illinois.  The SPECTRA sample consists of 19,836 observations on
supermarkets, grocery stores, and large-scale discounters from every state, except Alaska,
Delaware, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.  These data are
matched to the C&S Database sample using a statistical matching technique provided by
AUTOMATCH software. AUTOMATCH matches using a probabilistic algorithm.  The file match
utilized in this study is accomplished in four passes through the data, with the first pass matching
on zip code and the second matching on the soundex (a four-digit alphanumeric code that
represents the phonetic pronunciation) of the parsed outlet name.  The third pass matches on the
soundex of the parsed street name of the outlet, while the final pass matches on a combination of
the dwelling number and state of the outlet.  In this manner 1721 or 79 percent of BLS outlets were
matched.  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the BLS outlet lacks characteristic data is included in all
regressions using the SPECTRA data.  Missing data are imputed utilizing a hot-deck procedure.
I derive measures of competition from the number of outlets in a zip code using another
database obtained to InfoUsa, Inc., a marketing company in Nebraska.  An outlet is defined as
operating in a "competitive" environment if more than 5 outlets operate in its zip code.  It is defined
as being an oligopolist if it does not operate in a monopoly, duopoly, or competitive environment.32
Shopper density is defined as the total population per zip code divided by the number of stores in a
zip code using the InfoUsa sample.
Segregation indices
  Demographic data for this project were collected from a variety of sources.  Demographic
data by zip code were obtained from the 1990 Census utilizing Summary Tape File 3B.
Segregation indices were calculated using zip code data aggregated to the county level. The
dissimilarity and isolation indices are based on formulations outlined in Massey and Denton [1988].
The dissimilarity index is calculated as:
( )
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=   (A1)
where tz and pz are the total population and subgroup proportion in zip code z, and T and P are the
total population and subgroup  proportion in the county.  The index varies between 0 and 1 and
measures the proportion of subgroup members that would have to change their area of residence to
ensure an even distribution of groups in the county.  Index values above 0.6 are considered large
[Massey and Denton 1993].
The isolation index measures the likelihood that subgroup members come into contact only













where xz is the count of subgroup members in zip code z and X is the total number of subgroup
members county-wide.  This index also varies from 0 to 1, with higher index values indicating
greater isolation from the majority population.
     While the indices appear very similar they are conceptually distinct because it is possible to
simultaneously have a low index of dissimilarity and a high index of isolation.  This would occur if
the subgroup members were a relatively large proportion of the zip code, but experience very little
contact with majority members (Blau, 1977).
The indices used in this paper may be fairly low due to my choice of the zip code as the
aerial unit.  The spatial unit of observation largely determines the magnitude of the segregation
index.  This is because smaller aerial units (e.g., census tracts) may be more homogenous, which
generally yields higher indices of segregation.
Demographic Data
  Expenditure shares are taken from Table 2 of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (1997).
Information on central city status was obtained from U.S. Census Bureau  (http:// www.census.gov/
geo).  Data on land area by zip code were obtained from the MABLE/Geocorr V2.5 geographic
correspondence engine (http://www.census.gov/plue/geocorr).  Agency-level crime information by
zip code was compiled from the Uniform Crime Reports (ICPSR Study No. 9028) provided by the
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and data files provided from Marianne
Bertrand (University of Chicago) and Brian Doyle (Federal Reserve Board of Governors).  Crime
counts are assigned to neighborhoods by zip code. All demographic variables are matched to the
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Cereals and Bakery Products
Cereals and cereal products






Cornmeal Flour Prepared Flour
MixesAll neighborhoods in 
the U.S.
1
All BLS sample 
outlets
BLS sample outlets 
for which store 
characteristics are 
available
BLS Sample outlets 
located in neighborhoods 
where the proportion in 
poverty exceeds 20 
percent (poor)
BLS Sample outlets 
located in neighborhoods 
where the proportion in 
poverty is less than 20 
percent (non-poor)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion of population below the poverty 0.132 0.123 0.125 0.312 0.089
 level [0.099] [0.099] [0.100] [0.086] [0.050]
Proportion of counties with Black index of  0.019 0.320 0.361 0.400 0.305
 dissimilarity>0.6 and Index of Isolation>0.3
2
[0.136] [0.466] [0.480] [0.490] [0.461]
Proportion of counties with Black index of  0.164 0.507 0.563 0.634 0.485
 Isolation>0.3 [0.370] [0.500] [0.496] [0.482] [0.500]
Proportion of counties with Hispanic index of  0.009 0.210 0.223 0.312 0.192
 dissimilarity>0.6 and Index of Isolation>0.3 [0.093] [0.407] [0.416] [0.463] [0.394]
Proportion of counties with Hispanic index of  0.052 0.308 0.323 0.530 0.268
 Isolation>0.3 [0.223] [0.462] [0.468] [0.499] [0.443]
Search
Proportion of households without a vehicle 0.113 0.135 0.145 0.300 0.105
[0.126] [0.156] [0.166] [0.216] [0.121]
Number of stores in neighborhood (per  n/a
3
1.074 1.150 2.877 0.748
 square mile)*Poverty rate [1.298] [1.362] [1.923] [0.793]
Proportion of population completing up to  0.250 0.238 0.243 0.402 0.209
 grade 12, no diploma [0.127] [0.128] [0.130] [0.151] [0.097]
Proportion of population obtaining high  0.302 0.279 0.279 0.249 0.284
 school diploma, including GED [0.082] [0.074] [0.074] [0.071] [0.073]
Proportion of population completing some  0.206 0.215 0.212 0.190 0.220
 college, no degree [0.064] [0.060] [0.057] [0.094] [0.050]
Proportion of population with associate,  0.241 0.267 0.266 0.159 0.287
 bachelor, or graduate/professional degree [0.127] [0.129] [0.130] [0.096] [0.124]
Neighborhood demographics
Proportion of unoccupied housing units 0.087 0.066 0.065 0.100 0.061
[0.076] [0.046] [0.044] [0.051] [0.042]
Population density (per square mile, 3.938 7.135 8.063 13.156 6.048
 per zip code, ‚ 1,000) [9.436] [14.642] [15.976] [19.652] [13.253]
Proportion located in a central city 0.381 0.504 0.500 0.753 0.460
[0.486] [0.500] [0.500] [0.431] [0.498]
Proportion non-Hispanic White 0.756 0.697 0.683 0.348 0.761
[0.262] [0.279] [0.290] [0.293] [0.225]
Proportion non-hispanic Black 0.119 0.125 0.134 0.317 0.090
[0.198] [0.199] [0.209] [0.308] [0.146]
Proportion of Hispanic origin 0.089 0.124 0.129 0.296 0.093
[0.161] [0.192] [0.197] [0.315] [0.139]
Crime
Total property crime per capita n/a 0.072 0.071 0.126 0.062
[0.144] [0.138] [0.286] [0.096]
Total crime per capita n/a 0.079 0.078 0.140 0.068
[0.166] [0.161] [0.331] [0.109]
Operating Costs
Number of checkouts 8.700 9.822 9.770 8.739 10.017
---- [4.531] [5.011] [4.398] [4.527]
Number of full-time employees n/a 39.862 38.814 34.916 40.755
[21.935] [24.142] [23.365] [21.546]
Number of part-time employees n/a 56.279 53.113 46.625 58.022
[28.758] [30.942] [32.390] [27.697]
 -- (continued) --
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of independent variables: Comparison of BLS sample means of search costs, neighborhood 
demographics, store costs, and market structure to all neighborhoods in the U.S., Spectra-available data subsample, and BLS 
sample by poverty status(Table 1, continued)
All neighborhoods in 
the U.S.
1
All BLS sample 
outlets
BLS sample outlets 
for which store 
characteristics are 
available
BLS Sample outlets 
located in 
neighborhoods where 
the proportion in 
poverty exceeds 20 
percent (poor)
BLS Sample outlets 
located in 
neighborhoods where 
the proportion in 
poverty is less than 
20 percent (non-poor)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion chain stores 0.621 0.722 0.743 0.593 0.746
---- [0.448] [0.437] [0.491] [0.436]
Proportion with scanning equipment n/a 0.777 0.774 0.737 0.784
[0.378] [0.418] [0.411] [0.371]
Discretionary costs
Proportion using circulars 0.899 0.855 0.857 0.863 0.854
---- [0.295] [0.327] [0.288] [0.297]
Proportion using in-store demonstrations 0.664 0.624 0.617 0.601 0.628
---- [0.416] [0.460] [0.425] [0.414]
Proportion doubling coupons 0.437 0.367 0.367 0.273 0.383
---- [0.412] [0.456] [0.374] [0.417]
Proportion with frequent shopper program 0.215 0.213 0.213 0.173 0.220
---- [0.353] [0.390] [0.321] [0.358]
Proportion using in-store coupons 0.829 0.717 0.716 0.689 0.722
---- [0.383] [0.424] [0.401] [0.380]
Quality
Proportion with from-scratch bakery 0.466 0.692 0.688 0.564 0.715
---- [0.394] [0.436] [0.436] [0.381]
Proportion with delicatessen 0.772 0.851 0.848 0.740 0.872
---- [0.302] [0.334] [0.398] [0.277]
Proportion with butcher department 0.604 0.719 0.721 0.706 0.722
---- [0.380] [0.421] [0.391] [0.378]
Proportion with seafood department 0.433 0.662 0.662 0.522 0.687
---- [0.403] [0.445] [0.437] [0.391]
Proportion with pharmacy 0.264 0.379 0.374 0.279 0.397
---- [0.420] [0.465] [0.385] [0.424]
Proportion with full-service bank 0.221 0.226 0.225 0.197 0.231
---- [0.263] [0.291] [0.190] [0.274]
Proportion with automatic teller machine 0.618 0.701 0.704 0.589 0.722
---- [0.387] [0.428] [0.430] [0.375]
Proportion offering check cashing 0.614 0.585 0.588 0.547 0.591
 services ---- [0.421] [0.466] [0.431] [0.419]
Proportion with warehouse aisles 0.160 0.122 0.125 0.085 0.129
---- [0.266] [0.294] [0.218] [0.273]
Market structure
Number of stores per zip code n/a 1.769 2.029 2.935 1.559
 (per square mile) [6.029] [6.604] [6.635] [5.888]
Population per store (‚ 1,000) n/a 6.753 6.566 6.304 6.834
[6.077] [5.985] [4.622] [6.300]
Grocery selling area 27.341 31.173 30.882 26.592 32.000
 (in square feet, ‚ 1,000) ---- [15.013] [16.595] [16.896] [14.494]
Yearly sales volume  $11.328 $11.659 $11.600 $10.630 $11.846
 (in dollars, ‚ 1,000,000) ---- [10.423] [11.530] [9.507] [10.570]
Market share (share of yearly  n/a 0.328 0.316 0.301 0.333
 sales volume) [0.225] [0.247] [0.221] [0.225]
Number of observations 28619 2181 1728 308 1873
3Data not available.
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets. Neighborhood refers to the postal zip code. Means are weighted by the total population in the zip code. The BLS does not survey
Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, therefore these states are omitted from the above table. In addition, I do not have cost and quality data for stores in Arkansas,
Delaware, Kansas, and Rhode Island.  The number of observations in the BLS sample is the number of unique outlets.  There are multiple outlets in a zip code.
Source: Author's calculations using the 1990 Census STF3B, Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data, the Supermarket Census [Trade Dimensions 1998], and data obtained
from Spectra Marketing, Inc.
1Average store characteristic data for the U.S. are taken from the Supermarket Census [Trade Dimensions 1998]. 
2Segregation indices are calculated at the county level. The figure reported for the U.S. is the average of segregation indices in 3,005 counties. Racial indices refer to non-
Hispanic Blacks.One Gallon 






















Group status definition: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion in which 20 percent or nonpoor: 2.775 1.036 1.090 0.832 0.805 1.321
 more of residents are below the  (0.042) (0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012)
 poverty level poor: 2.732 0.933 1.020 0.680 0.758 1.235
(0.090) (0.023) (0.048) (0.094) (0.045) (0.034)
poor-nonpoor: -0.043 -0.103 -0.070 -0.152 -0.047 -0.086
[.666] [.000] [.024] [.114] [.334] [.016]
Proportion in 80th percentile of state  nonpoor: 2.768 1.029 1.107 0.814 0.795 1.312
 poverty distribution (0.044) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013)
poor: 2.779 0.963 0.982 0.766 0.811 1.283
(0.062) (0.018) (0.039) (0.075) (0.043) (0.027)
poor-nonpoor: 0.011 -0.066 -0.125 -0.048 0.016 -0.029
[.886] [.010] [.009] [.536] [.725] [.326]
Proportion in 90th percentile of state  nonpoor: 2.777 1.027 1.088 0.824 0.798 1.316
 poverty distribution (0.040) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012)
poor: 2.624 0.934 1.013 0.679 0.798 1.220
(0.101) (0.019) (0.069) (0.124) (0.047) (0.042)
poor-nonpoor: -0.153 -0.093 -0.075 -0.145 0.000 -0.096
[.166] [.000] [.310] [.252] [.999] [.028]
First quintile of poverty rate nonpoor: 2.788 1.016 1.123 0.847 0.852 1.336
(0.109) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.023) (0.028)
Second quintile of poverty rate nonpoor: 2.789 1.048 1.104 0.813 0.787 1.319
(0.074) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.023)
Third quintile of poverty rate nonpoor: 2.749 1.036 1.087 0.862 0.747 1.309
(0.071) (0.033) (0.072) (0.053) (0.034) (0.024)
Fourth quintile of poverty rate poor: 2.734 1.022 1.077 0.685 0.749 1.260
(0.089) (0.035) (0.108) (0.044) (0.022) (0.025)
Fifth quintile of poverty rate poor: 2.779 0.963 0.982 0.766 0.811 1.283
(0.062) (0.018) (0.039) (0.075) (0.043) (0.027)
poor(fourth quintile)-
nonpoor(first quintile): -0.054 0.006 -0.046 -0.162 -0.103 -0.076
[.705] [.901] [.689] [.007] [.001] [.044]
poor(fifth quintile)-
nonpoor(first quintile): -0.009 -0.053 -0.141 -0.081 -0.041 -0.053
[.942] [.176] [.012] [.344] [.403] [.172]
Overall mean price 2.765 1.018 1.081 0.803 0.798 1.306
Standard deviation of overall mean price 1.783 0.821 0.909 1.211 0.532 0.012
Total number of observations 2176 2825 1634 2418 1117 10170
Source: Author's calculations using the Bureau of Labor Statistics price level data  and 1990 Census STF 3B.
Note: The unit of observation is the price including tax. Standard errors (robust to correlation of residuals within stores) are in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.
The last column is the weighted-sum of the average item prices, where the weights are the low-income expenditure shares taken from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Prices are weighted by the base-period quantity weight (see the BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 17).
Table 2.   Mean price differences of homogenous items by alternative definitions of poor  Overall
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Poor -0.067 -0.074 -0.092 -0.093 -0.090 -0.079 -0.081 -0.064 -0.061
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.034)
Other covariates included? no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
P-values of joint-test of the explanatory contribution of covariate groups:
Neighborhood demographics  ---- ---- 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.027 0.013 0.022 0.038
Crime variables  ---- ---- ---- 0.890 0.694 0.354 0.379 0.856 0.644
Operating costs  ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.082 0.652 0.911 0.918 0.817
Discretionary costs  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.023 0.047 0.049 0.068
Market structure variables  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.052 0.041 0.085
Search variables  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.006 0.018
Quality variables  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.004
Adjusted R
2 0.967 0.977 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.979 0.979
1The coefficients reported are the sum of the poor and race/ethnicity main effects and interaction. 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the unit price plus tax (price per ounce). Sample size is 10,170. All regressions include an intercept,
item dummies, and local area fixed-effects. The other covariates are product size, a dummy variable indicating a sale price, and month dummies.
Prices are weighted by the base-period quantity weight (see the BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 17). Standard errors (robust to the correlation of
residuals within stores) are in parentheses. The specific variables included in each category are listed in Table 1. The neighborhood demographics
category excludes the race/ethnicity variables.
Source: Author's calculations using the 1990 Census STF3B, Spectra, Inc. data on store characteristics, InfoUSA, Inc. data on market structure, and
Bureau of Labor Statistics price level data.
Table 3.  FE estimates of the effect of sequentially controlling for factors related to price dispersion on the 
unit price (price per ounce plus tax) differential for the poorOne Gallon of Vitamin D 
fortified, whole milk
Nonkosher, broiler/fryer whole 
chicken
One-dozen, large, Grade A 
white eggs Loose Navel oranges
Individually packaged 
Iceberg lettuce
Neighborhoods where the proportion in poverty exceeds 20 percent (poor)
Neighborhood income measure: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Median household income  -0.115 0.251 -0.040 -0.332 -0.052 0.234 -0.014 0.604 0.151 1.239
 (‚ 10,000) (0.071) (0.001) (0.054) (0.014) (0.080) (0.002) (0.317) (0.028) (0.243) (0.024)
Other covariates included? no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Number of observations 393 393 492 492 224 224 404 404 167 167
Adjusted R
2 0.108 0.778 0.290 0.821 0.051 0.865 0.235 0.809 0.344 0.610
Neighborhoods where the proportion in poverty is less than 20 percent (affluent)
Neighborhood income measure: (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Median household income  0.016 0.008 0.021 -0.067 0.086 0.092 0.020 -0.004 0.059 0.006
 (‚ 10,000) (0.014) (0.030) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.046) (0.016) (0.038) (0.020) (0.005)
Other covariates included? no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Number of observations 1783 1783 2333 2333 1410 1410 2014 2014 950 950
Adjusted R
2
0.172 0.796 0.255 0.714 0.310 0.785 0.454 0.624 0.368 0.709
Budget share weighted-average of price differentials (b-bar):
Without covariates: With covariates:
b-bar(affluent): 0.033 (0.007) -0.008 (0.013)
b-bar(poor): -0.006 (0.090) 0.427 (0.009)
b-bar(affluent) - b-bar(poor): 0.039 (0.090) -0.435 (0.015)
Source: Author's calculations using the 1990 Census STF3B, Spectra, Inc. data on store characteristics, and Bureau of Labor Statistics price level data.
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the unit price plus tax (price per ounce). All regressions include an intercept, a dummy variable indicating a sale price, and month dummies. The other
covariates include the neighborhood, crime, operating and discretionary cost, market structure, search, and quality covariates indicated in Table 1 (excluding the race variables from the neighborhood
demographics category), dummies for store format, regional dummies, and local-area fixed effects. The top panel shows the coefficients for the poor neighborhoods in the sample, while the middle panel shows
the coefficients for the affluent neighborhoods. The bottom panel shows the expenditure-share weighted average for the column coefficients. Each weighted average is calculated using the expenditure share for
the poor.  Prices are weighted by the base-period quantity weight (see the BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 17).  Standard errors (robust to the correlation of residuals within stores) are in parentheses.  
Table 4.   Estimates accounting for between-item dispersion on the calculation of the price differential between poor and affluent neighborhoods  
(neighborhood income measured by median household income)Store type
















Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Poor neighborhoods -0.262 -0.054 -0.116 -0.054 -0.151 -0.107 -0.305 -0.103 -0.103 0.042 -0.114 -0.183 -0.096
(0.055) (0.041) (0.061) (0.045) (0.087) (0.061) (0.091) (0.041) (0.101) (0.069) (0.097) (0.071) (0.051)
Number of 
observations 3794 2997 2985 4967 5203 2152 2083 3582 2353 3109 789 1288 4984
Adjusted R
2 0.986 0.989 0.973 0.981 0.982 0.988 0.990 0.987 0.856 0.988 0.940 0.980 0.983
2The coefficients reported are the sum of the poor and race/ethnicity main effects and interaction. 
Source: Author's calculations using the 1990 Census STF3B, Spectra, Inc. data on store characteristics, and Bureau of Labor Statistics price level data.
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the unit price plus tax (price per ounce). All regressions include product size, a dummy variable indicating a sale price, and month dummies, as well as the neighborhood, crime, operating and
discretionary cost, market structure, search, and quality covariates indicated in Table 1 (excluding the race variables from the neighborhood demographics category), and local area fixed-effects. Prices are weighted by the base-period quantity
weight (see the BLS Handbook of Methods, chapter 17).  Standard errors (robust to the correlation of residuals within stores) are in parentheses.  
1A superstore is a supermarket with at least 30,000 square feet and annual sales in excess of $12 million, offering specialty departments and extensive services.  Store type is based on data obtained from Spectra Marketing, Inc. 
Table 5.  Investigating  the effect of store type, central city status, and regional variation on FE estimates of the poor price gap Variables Spectra sample BLS sample outlets
Search
Proportion of households without a vehicle 0.208 0.135
[0.220] [0.156]
Number of stores in neighborhood (per  1.930 1.074
 square mile)*Poverty rate [2.545] [1.298]
Proportion of population completing up to  0.272 0.238
 grade 12, no diploma [0.144] [0.128]
Proportion of population obtaining high  0.273 0.279
 school diploma, including GED [0.074] [0.074]
Proportion of population completing some  0.201 0.215
 college, no degree [0.057] [0.060]
Proportion of population with associate,  0.254 0.267
 bachelor, or graduate/professional degree [0.141] [0.129]
Neighborhood demographics
Proportion of unoccupied housing units 0.071 0.066
[0.046] [0.046]
Population density (per square mile, 12.934 7.135
 per zip code, ‚ 1,000) [22.222] [14.642]
Proportion located in a central city 0.513 0.504
[0.500] [0.500]
Proportion non-Hispanic White 0.613 0.697
[0.318] [0.279]
Proportion non-Hispanic Black 0.179 0.125
[0.250] [0.199]
Proportion of Hispanic origin 0.157 0.124
[0.210] [0.192]
Crime
Total property crime per capita 0.139 0.072
[0.433] [0.144]
Total crime per capita 0.159 0.079
[0.508] [0.166]
Operating costs
Number of checkouts 6.985 9.822
[4.784] [4.531]
Number of full-time employees 24.804 39.862
[22.117] [21.935]
Number of part-time employees 32.077 56.279
[29.725] [28.758]
Proportion chain stores 0.652 0.722
[0.269] [0.448]
Proportion with scanning equipment 0.484 0.777
[0.500] [0.378]
 -- (continued) --
Appendix Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics: Comparison of BLS sample means of search 
costs, neighborhood demographics, store costs, and market structure to the Spectra 
sample of stores(Appendix Table 1, continued)
Variables Spectra sample BLS sample outlets
Discretionary costs
Proportion using circulars 0.812 0.855
[0.309] [0.295]
Proportion using in-store demonstrations 0.555 0.624
[0.394] [0.416]
Proportion doubling coupons 0.370 0.367
[0.380] [0.412]
Proportion with frequent shopper program 0.179 0.213
[0.304] [0.353]
Proportion using in-store coupons 0.640 0.717
[0.380] [0.383]
Quality
Proportion with from-scratch bakery 0.573 0.692
[0.392] [0.394]
Proportion with delicatessen 0.783 0.851
[0.330] [0.302]
Proportion with butcher department 0.632 0.719
[0.381] [0.380]
Proportion with seafood department 0.557 0.662
[0.393] [0.403]
Proportion with pharmacy 0.297 0.379
[0.382] [0.420]
Proportion with full-service bank 0.173 0.226
[0.208] [0.263]
Proportion with automatic teller machine 0.596 0.701
[0.388] [0.387]
Proportion offering check cashing services 0.531 0.585
[0.394] [0.421]
Proportion with warehouse aisles 0.121 0.122
[0.248] [0.266]
Market structure
Number of stores per zip code (per square 4.700 1.769
 mile) [11.748] [6.029]
Population per store (‚ 1,000) 5.192 6.753
[4.651] [6.077]
Grocery selling area  21.202 34.029
 (square feet in thousands) [16.413] [21.676]
Yearly sales volume (in thousands) $6.452 $11.659
[8.462] [10.423]
Market share (share of yearly  0.221 0.328
 sales volume) [0.226] [0.225]
Number of observations 19836 2181
Source: Author's calculations using the 1990 Census STF3B, Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data, and data
obtained from Spectra Marketing, Inc.
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets. Means are weighted by the total zip code population. The unit of
observation is a postal zip code. The BLS does not survey Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, therefore
these states are omitted from the above table. In addition, I do not have cost and quality data for stores in
Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, and Rhode Island. The number of observations in the BLS sample is the number
of unique outlets.  There are multiple outlets in a zip code.